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he 2007-09 global financial crisis led to a 
virtual collapse in economic activity and 
increased financial volatility worldwide. 
For the developing countries, the main 
channel of transmission has been a drop in 
external transactions, such as trade, financial 
and capital flows, and remittances. The 
southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
(SEMC)1 have also faced declining economic 
activity, although there seems to be 
considerable variation in the relative 
magnitudes and timing of the decline. Most of 
the economies in the Mediterranean basin 
have had delayed but longer-lasting 
consequences as a result of the crisis, driven 
mostly by their endemic trade and investment 
ties with the EU2 and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries.   
                                                      
1  This report analyses 11 countries in the southern and 
eastern Mediterranean, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey. 
2 The European Mediterranean countries (e.g. France, 
Italy and Spain) are among the main exporting 
partners of almost all 11 SEMCs, except four of the 
eastern countries. Israel, Turkey and Palestine export 
relatively more products to some Western European 
Further to the potential effects of the global 
financial crisis, the Arab uprisings erupting in 
2011 in several of the countries in the region 
and the resulting political instabilities have 
added to the socio-economic and financial 
woes of these countries. The simultaneity and 
partial causality of the global financial crisis 
and the Arab uprisings make it especially 
challenging to disentangle the effects of one 
from the other.   
This Policy Brief therefore tries to draw policy 
lessons from the combination of the global 
financial crisis and the Arab uprisings 
focusing on the domains related to fiscal, 
monetary and financial policies. It does so by 
answering the following questions: What has 
been the impact of the crisis and the uprisings 
on the fiscal, monetary and financial policies 
of the SEMCs? What have been the crisis 
management actions? And what policy lessons 
can be drawn for crisis management in the 
future? And how can the EU contribute to this 
within the Euro-Med Partnership? The 
                                                                                    
countries and the United Kingdom, whereas Jordan 
has no strong export relations with any of the EU 
member states. 
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analysis builds on the work of Ayadi (2013), 
which provides a comprehensive assessment 
on the macroeconomic and financial impacts 
of the global financial crisis and the Arab 
uprisings on SEMCs, paying special attention 
to the fiscal, monetary and financial policy 
measures to respond to the negative effects of 
the crises.     
1.  Crisis transmission channels 
The impact of the 2007-09 global financial 
crisis on the economies in the Mediterranean 
basin has been relatively limited and delayed. 
Real GDP growth had been increasing in most 
of the SEMCs countries in the years just prior 
to the crisis, as shown in Figure 1. In the first 
two years of the crisis, the growth levelled off 
in the SEMCs, except for Israel and Turkey. In 
fact, these two Eastern Mediterranean 
economies are relatively more open and have 
stronger ties with the US, Western European 
countries and the United Kingdom, which 
were among the first that suffered from the 
global financial crisis. And thereafter, from 
2009 onwards until recently, economic growth 
has started to decline, but remained positive in 
most SEMCs. Hence, as shown in Figure 1, 
Turkey recorded a negative real GDP growth 
in the midst of the crisis and the Tunisian 
economy stalled in 2011, when the Arab 
uprisings kicked off. 
 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth rates in selected SEMCs, 2006-12 
 
Source: World Bank WDI (2013). 
The global financial crisis has also had an 
impact on the other SEMCs. To disentangle 
the various ways through which the global 
financial crisis can impact the SEMCs, we 
have devised a framework for tracing 
international crisis transmission channels 
(see Figure 2). These channels have been 
grouped into three broad categories: real 
transmission channels (i.e. trade, foreign 
direct investment – FDI, transfers, public 
finances, trade and commodity prices), 
monetary transmission channels (i.e. money 
supply, target interest rates and reserves) 
and financial transmission channels (i.e. 
capital markets and financial 
intermediation). 
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Figure 2. Framework for international crisis transmission channels 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
1.1  Real transmission channel 
The analyses in Chapter 2 of Ayadi (2013) 
show that both the majority of the positive 
and negative spill-over effects of the global 
financial crisis have been transmitted 
through the real channels. The economies of 
the SEMCs suffered lower net foreign direct 
investments (FDI) flows and declining 
exports, while the impact on transfers, 
public finances and commodity prices has 
been more ambiguous.   
The net FDI flows of the emerging SEMCs 
declined in 2009 on average by a third. 
Moreover, the countries that experienced 
intense uprisings suffered a second sharp 
decline. Hence, FDI declined in both Egypt 
and Tunisia by 1-2% of GDP in 2011, 
possibly much more in Libya. The exports in 
the SEMCs have also declined significantly 
in 2009. Their foreign trade was unable to 
resist the adverse impact of the drop in 
demand in the EU, the US and Asia.   
Remittances have also declined in 2009, but 
not so much and with significant variations 
across countries. In turn, the region’s 
tourism industry has benefited from the 
world’s travellers switching from 
higher-cost to more modestly priced 
destinations. Proactive policies oriented 
towards stimulating tourism demand have 
been useful as well. However, in 2011 due to 
political instability, tourism in Egypt and 
Syria collapsed, and in Tunisia the sector’s 
receipts declined by 40%. 4 | AYADI & DE GROEN 
 
Moreover, the impact in changes of 
commodity prices on the SEMCs is complex. 
Despite a short, sharp fall in prices around 
the middle of the crisis in September 2008, 
they have rebound since 2007. Yet almost all 
SEMCs are net importers of food and energy 
commodities and thus suffer from rising 
prices. Countries with large oil exports, i.e. 
Algeria and Libya, are the only exception. 
SEMCs have many fiscal challenges 
concerning deficits, debt reduction and the 
maintenance of fiscal discipline. However, 
most countries in the region face some 
specific fiscal issues, such as relatively high 
p u b l i c  d e b t ,  d e p e n d e n c e  o n  s o m e  f o r m  o f  
aid and financial concession, exposure to 
fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices, high 
defence expenditures and weak tax bases. 
Fiscal consolidation efforts could be a major 
part of the institutional reforms that might 
be affected by the global economic crisis and 
therefore postponed for a few years. The 
costs of external debt for emerging countries 
on international financial markets started to 
increase in July 2007, but it was not until 
October 2008 that the spreads started rising 
sharply. Credit ratings began to worsen 
starting in 2011 with numerous predictable 
downgrades for Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, 
which also negatively affected their 
neighbouring countries’ outlooks.     
1.2  Monetary transmission channel 
Monetary stimulus in the region was quite 
uniform. During 2008, inflation moved into 
double digits in several countries linked to 
the increases in commodity prices. Hence, 
25% increase of inflation in SEMCs between 
December 2005 and December 2007 was 
caused by international food prices – more 
than twice the level for the next affected 
region. The authorities undertook measures 
to offset the most adverse effects on the 
poor. These measures included increased 
subsidies, measures to boost incomes 
through higher civil service wages, and 
finally an increase in interest rates in a 
number of countries to counter the 
inflationary impulse. The Central Bank of 
Egypt, for example, increased the key policy 
rates by 275 basis points between February 
and September 2008. The short sharp fall in 
commodity prices thereafter has lessened 
the concerns over inflationary pressures, 
which was reinforced by GDP growth below 
potential. The lower inflation created space 
for monetary easing.  However, in 2011, 
inflationary pressures started building up 
again against the background of rising 
commodity prices.   
Interest rates have remained relatively low, 
both internationally and in the SEMCs since 
the crisis, which is the result of the easy 
monetary policy applied in order to 
stimulate the world economies. Reductions 
in policy rates have generally been more 
cautious and to a large extent dictated by 
exchange rate considerations, because most 
SEMCs are targeting a steady nominal 
exchange rate.   
In general, the levels of official reserves 
remained stable during 2009 and similar to 
pre-crisis levels, but they fell slightly in 
certain countries in 2010-12 (e.g. Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia). The 
situation even became critical in Egypt in 
2012 with the central bank attempting to 
prevent the Egyptian pound from 
depreciating, and allowing the level of 
official reserves in the country to fall under 
the internationally acceptable threshold of 3 
months worth of imports. More recently, 
through the help of Libya, Qatar and later 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
the Egyptian official reserves improved 
slightly, but they still stand at only $15 
billion, which isn’t really sufficient and 
leaves little room for central bank 
manoeuvres. 
1.3  Financial transmission channels 
Most of the SEMCs were spared the 
negative impact experienced elsewhere 
from the crisis on their banking and capitals 
markets during the initial phase between POLICY LESSONS FOR MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SEMCS | 5 
 
2007 and 2008. Banks in the region had little 
direct exposure to the toxic products that 
weakened the balance sheets of many banks 
in the US or the EU and were relatively 
well-capitalised before entering the crisis. 
However, some vulnerability in certain 
banking sectors was revealed in countries 
that were more integrated in the global 
financial markets, such as Turkey and Israel. 
Capital-market contagion effects were 
equally very limited in the SEMCs (again 
with some exceptions for Israel and Turkey), 
confirming the low level of 
interconnectedness between these and 
global financial markets.   
Hence, no major financial institutions in the 
SEMCs failed in the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis. In addition, credit growth has 
remained positive, in line with the subdued 
decrease in output. The region’s mainly 
bank-based financial systems were 
well-capitalised and avoided significant 
exposure to US subprime or other 
structured securities. Moreover, reinforcing 
confidence, Jordan instituted a guarantee on 
bank deposits, while Egypt reiterated an 
existing implicit guarantee and in 2009 even 
announced plans to launch an explicit 
deposit insurance fund scheme. 
Portfolio investments have generally 
decelerated too, reflecting the slump in the 
global stock market and in the Middle 
Eastern bourses, as discussed below. As of 
2013, they still remain lower than in other 
developing and emerging markets. The 
SEMCs followed this general trend, and the 
decline in stock prices is visible both in the 
main index performance and in the overall 
market capitalisation. Since March 2009, 
SEMCs’ financial markets have begun to 
turn around with partial recovery after the 
large drop in the major stock market indices. 
Markets in the region have generally 
outperformed the MSCI Emerging Market 
Index, except for Egypt and Morocco in 2010 
and 2011. 
Much like their peers elsewhere, the 
economies in the region have implemented 
various initiatives to respond to the crises 
and control the negative impacts. To a large 
extent, fiscal and unconventional monetary 
measures have been the preferred choice, 
owing partly to the limited policy space for 
manoeuvre that the authorities have in these 
countries. While these policies appear to 
have been successful, they have also put 
additional strain on existing and future 
fiscal and monetary pressures. The 
following section looks at the impact of the 
global financial crisis and the region’s policy 
responses.   
2.  Lessons in crisis management 
Knowing the channels through which the 
2007-11 global financial crisis impacted the 
SEMCs and the responses to it from 
governments and national monetary 
authorities, this section draws some lessons 
for effective crisis management in the 
future. The main policy responses have been 
summarised and linked to the three broad 
groups of transmission channels in 
Figure  3. The concrete policy 
recommendations are explained in greater 
detail in what follows. 
 
Figure  3. The concrete policy 
recommendations are explained in greater 
detail in what follows.   6 | AYADI & DE GROEN 
 
Figure 3. Recommended policy responses by transmission channel 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the global 
financial crisis was an exogenous shock to 
the SEMCs, Ayadi (2013) also confirm that 
while the economic slowdown has been 
modest, most of the SEMCs are likely to 
experience a slow recovery. Limited external 
financing, little space for fiscal stimulus, 
sluggish receipts from tourism and 
remittances and increasing commodity 
prices in the future will all continue to be a 
drag on growth for some time. Thus, the 
weaknesses in the short term are expected to 
persist, due largely to the slow 
improvement in the world economy. 
Nevertheless, there is room to improve the 
foundation of fiscal, monetary and financial 
policy-making and the policies itself. 
2.1  Fiscal policy  
To achieve fiscal sustainability, 
governments in the SEMCs have to 
undertake scenario analysis when 
determining their fiscal position and future 
policy measures in terms of introducing 
fiscal stimuli. As has been outlined in Ayadi 
et al. (2013), when applied to the Egyptian 
and Tunisian cases, tax revenues are 
forecasted based on highly optimistic 
assumptions that do not take into account 
the possibility of a lower level of private 
investment and therefore lower level of tax 
revenue. The direct implication of such an 
optimistic assumption is an increase in the 
budget deficit and in the debt ratio, beyond 
the level the government expected. 
Therefore, it is strongly recommended that 
governments, in particular in Egypt and 
Tunisia where efforts have been made, 
should adopt a pessimistic approach to 
forecasting revenue to b e  o n  t h e  s a f e  s i d e  
and should make their expenditure plans 
based on careful revenue assumptions. 
However, to respond to the crisis and 
subsequent demands by their citizens in the 
period following the Arab uprisings, all 
governments succumbed to the temptation 
to increase expenditures (e.g. increasing 
wages and hiring in the public sector). Such 
actions will have dramatic implications for 
the future and will be a heavy weight to POLICY LESSONS FOR MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SEMCS | 7 
 
carry for years to come. Therefore, it is 
strongly recommended to avoid 
unnecessary current expenditures; and to 
try to minimise and rationalise all areas of 
spending, like subsidies and purchases of 
goods and services. If any kind of public 
expenditure is required to stimulate growth, 
it should be oriented mainly towards capital 
expenditure (i.e. government investment), 
particularly in infrastructure projects that 
could yield significant impact on growth, 
and preferably oriented towards 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects 
that could also stimulate domestic private 
investments. 
With the continuing sharp decreasing of 
global FDI flows, SEMCs continue to be 
directly affected by this trend. Competition 
to attract FDI will become even tougher and 
countries in the region are advised to 
implement policies aiming at improving 
their private investment environment, in 
particular legal certainty and investor 
protection. In that respect, political stability, 
good governance and the rule of law 
diminish the risks for foreign investors, 
reducing the volatility of FDI flows.     
The financial crisis has impacted the 
external sector through a slowdown of 
exports, which is expected to continue as 
long as growth and unemployment figures 
in trading partners remain gloomy. To 
tackle this, SEMCs are recommended to 
implement policies aiming at diversifying 
exports markets and facilitating export 
procedures. Embassies and commercial 
bureaus of SEMCs in different countries can 
seek proactively to open new export 
markets in emerging countries that have the 
potential of absorbing new exports, which 
will contribute to diversifying trade away 
from conventional trading partners. This 
can also be done through organising 
seminars for producers and exporters, 
participating in international fairs to 
advertise their products and services, as 
well as negotiating active trade agreements 
with new partners.   
Tourism and remittances proved resilient 
during the financial crisis, but with global 
recession persisting and wealth effects 
settling in, and continuing political 
instability and its detrimental economic 
consequences, countries in the region might 
not be able to sustain high GDP growth. 
Accordingly, they are recommended to put 
in effect policies to promote tourism 
demand, as for example Egypt has done. As 
far as remittances are concerned, the 
resilience shown could be due to the fact 
that migrants who have lost their jobs return 
home with their stock of accumulated 
savings, which helps to compensate for the 
reduced flows of remittances. This 
compensation however, might come to an 
end as it is a onetime event. Hence, SEMC’s 
are recommended to develop close links 
with countries in need of workers to fill 
gaps in the labour market in the host 
countries and/or to provide incentives to 
returning migrants to develop new activities 
in their home country.   
2.2  Monetary policy  
Central banks in the SEMCs have opted to 
pursue an accommodative monetary policy 
by means of unconventional monetary tools, 
much like their counterparts elsewhere. In 
the absence of an early warning system, 
however, such interventions may become 
disruptive and at a minimum, fail to 
produce the expected outcome. It is 
therefore recommended to establish an early 
warning system (EWS) and effective early 
prevention system as was developed in 
Bakardzhieva & Kamar (2013) to prevent 
systemic risks and crises. Such a system is 
built on i) macroeconomic resilience factors, 
ii) factors of bank fragility (CAMELS ratios) 
and iii) macro-prudential factors. 
With the decline in interest rates and 
inflation worldwide and also the decline in 
inflation in all our sample countries, there is 
room for adopting an expansionary 
monetary policy through decreasing interest 
rates to stimulate domestic demand. 8 | AYADI & DE GROEN 
 
Encouraging credit to the private sector will 
also contribute to enhancing investment and 
consumption. In particular, credit targeting 
the housing sector can act as a driver of 
growth. However, the authorities need to 
carefully assess the risks of overheating 
posed by excessively high growth of credit 
to the private sector, and be ready to react 
with different monetary policy tools, such as 
increasing interest rates and introducing 
required reserve ratios.  Maintaining 
exchange rates close to their equilibrium 
levels will enhance competitiveness while 
controlling inflation. 
Finally, it is clear that the exchange rate 
could be an issue for debt sustainability. On 
the one hand, maintaining a fixed exchange 
rate at an overvalued level is harmful for the 
whole economy and is obviously 
unsustainable. On the other hand, 
devaluation of the currency can lead to 
serious implications for debt sustainability. 
The case of Egypt is worth mentioning. 
Indeed, the sharp decline in the official 
reserves in Egypt, combined with an 
appreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate over the past ten years, point to the 
urgent need for an exchange rate correction.   
The recent depreciation is a step in the right 
direction, but the continuous interventions 
from the Central Bank are both irrational 
and harmful. The Gulf countries’ deposits in 
the Central Bank are systematically 
absorbed by the market, leading to the need 
for more borrowing. The mismanagement of 
the exchange rate in Egypt is only leading to 
higher debt without any stabilisation of the 
market. Therefore, and in the absence of 
alternatives, the Central Bank should allow 
the exchange rate to float and depreciate. 
This will increase the debt ratio, indeed, but 
it will avoid accumulating more and more 
foreign debt, and ultimately the need to 
devalue the currency, which would result in 
an even higher debt. 
2.3  Financial policy 
The collective assessment of the regulatory 
and supervisory structures of the SEMCs 
against European Mediterranean standards 
in the pre- and post-crisis gives a mixed 
picture, as was detailed in Ayadi & De 
Groen (2013). Despite some improvements 
in capital requirements stringency, key 
weaknesses remain in deposit insurance, 
entry obstacles and the strength of legal 
rights. Moreover, some disparities have also 
become more apparent, especially in the 
potential for political interference and 
private monitoring. Therefore, the countries 
are strongly advised to continue the reforms 
towards reaching full regulatory 
convergence on international best practices. 
Looking ahead, ongoing initiatives to 
diversify financing channels away from 
banks need to be pursued. In particular, 
policy-makers should increasingly see value 
in developing alternatives to bank financing, 
such as local debt markets for large 
corporations, thus allowing banks to 
concentrate more on financing small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, which create 
private-sector jobs and more diversified 
economies. At the same time, this would 
attenuate the adverse impact of banking 
distress on the provision of credit and will 
help enhance corporate governance as debt 
issuance will demand more rigorous 
financial disclosure and transparency. 
3.  Contribution to the future of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership   
Notwithstanding the negative impact a 
more open economy experiences in times of 
a global financial crisis, more-intensive 
international relations ultimately contribute 
to socio-economic development. It is 
therefore a particularly worrisome prospect 
that the region is slowing down progress on 
institutional reform and its pursuit of a 
strategy of openness. In that context, the POLICY LESSONS FOR MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SEMCS | 9 
 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 3  should 
not be seen as a narrowly defined trade and 
investment relationship but as a much 
broader strategy for sustainable and 
inclusive socio-economic development. To 
that end, the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership can serve to diversify the 
economies in question by putting in place a 
long-term socio-economic co-development 
strategy that will be able to respond to the 
key challenges the region faces.   
Several actions can be developed such as 
encouraging Public Private Partnerships 
using BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) and 
BOOT (Build, Own, Operate, Transfer) 
between European/local companies, 
local/foreign investors and the government. 
Public investments in infrastructure are a 
key policy tool for dealing with the crisis, 
but they can be limited by the available 
fiscal capacity. Public Private Partnerships 
like BOT and BOOT in building 
infrastructure can be an attractive 
alternative, as they can also stimulate 
private investments.   
Within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
private European companies can take part 
in this process as partners with the domestic 
private sector and the government. In this 
case, the European companies can enhance 
their business and improve their 
profitability, with a positive effect on their 
economies. Domestic private investors will 
benefit as well in the same way, but will also 
be exposed to the expertise of the European 
companies. The governments will benefit 
from the infrastructure projects without 
having the burden of adding to the fiscal 
deficit. The Euro-Med agreement can 
provide the framework through which 
European firms can be privileged to gain 
these BOT and BOOT contracts.   
Moreover, limited fiscal space and the need 
to maintain stimulus expenditures can lead 
                                                      
3 For background on the Partnership, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-r
egions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership. 
to significant financing pressures. As seen in 
the recent example of Greece, an increase in 
the cost of borrowing can create an 
unsustainable fiscal stance. One way to 
avoid a situation in which interest rates on 
government borrowing increase sharply is 
to show the markets that cheaper financing 
is available. Seeking the IMF’s assistance is 
one option, but it is usually an indicator that 
the economy is unable to create a solution 
on its own.   
Creating a Euro-Med Fund for financial 
assistance can be an alternative. The idea of 
a Mediterranean Monetary Fund was first 
launched by the economist Bassem Kamar 
in 1999 as a way to contain speculative 
attacks against any Mediterranean currency. 
During an ongoing crisis, a pool of reserves 
like the East Asian Chiang-Mai initiative4 
can provide immediate liquidity to country 
members, which has the particularity of 
reassuring the markets and making 
financing through the markets available at 
reasonable interest rates. 
4.  Final remarks 
In the aftermath of the 2007-09 global 
financial crisis and the 2011 Arab uprisings, 
the SEMCs have reached a turning point in 
their history. This Policy Brief has assessed 
the crisis management response in the fiscal, 
monetary and financial domains with the 
aim of drawing key lessons for its future, 
which holds many uncertainties. To give a 
broad range of insights on how these 
opportunities and challenges facing the 
region today can develop under various 
scenarios in the period up to 2030, we refer 
the reader to the large body of research 
carried out under the Mediterranean 
Prospects (MEDPRO) project, funded under 
                                                      
4   Launched in 2010, the initiative involves a 
multilateral currency swap arrangement among the 
10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the People's Republic of China 
(including Hong Kong), Japan and South Korea. 10 | AYADI & DE GROEN 
 
the 7th Framework Programme of the 
European Commission.5  
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